



ITWG NUCLEAR FORENSICS UPDATE

No. 39 June 2026

CHAIRPERSONS' ADDRESS

Welcome to the 39th edition of the Nuclear Forensics International Technical Working Group (ITWG) newsletter. The summer has arrived and with it the excitement of the annual ITWG meeting. This year's gathering, ITWG-29, took place in July in Berlin, Germany. We wish to thank the German government for hosting the event and in particular Jens-Tarek Eishah of the German Federal Office for Radiation Protection (BfS) for his outstanding organizational work.

The Global Forum to Prevent Radiological and Nuclear Terrorism (Global FTPRNT) was established in 2022 to fill the gap left by the suspension of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT). Since then, Global FTPRNT has become a pivotal platform for international coordination, as demonstrated by its inaugural meeting in Bucharest, Romania (November 2024), and the recent second plenary in Rabat, Morocco (February 2026). Both events highlighted the vital role of nuclear forensics in counterterrorism efforts. Please read the accompanying article on Global FTPRNT's plans to deepen global commitment to collaborative deterrence and preparedness against radiological and nuclear terrorism.

Sidney Niemeyer is widely regarded as one of the founding figures of nuclear forensics. While at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory he helped to organize the landmark 1995 International Conference on Nuclear Smuggling Forensic Analysis, an event that directly led to the formation of the ITWG. Sid is one of the most multifaceted members of the ITWG: in addition to his work as a physicist and a pastor, he has recently published two nuclear forensics thrillers. Take a look at the full interview in this update to discover Sid's influence on the development of nuclear forensics in the United States and worldwide.

With best regards,

James Blankenship and Maria Wallenius

QUICK SUMMARY OF THE 29TH ITWG ANNUAL MEETING

JAMES BLANKENSHIP AND MARIA WALLENIOUS

The 29th annual meeting of the Nuclear Forensics International Technical Working Group (ITWG-29) was held on 14–16 July 2026 in Berlin, Germany, under the auspices of the German government. Last year the ITWG celebrated its 30-year anniversary in Bologna, Italy, and this year we marked 30 years since the first ITWG meeting was held in Germany (ITWG-1, Karlsruhe, 1996).

During ITWG-28 in Bologna the programme was adapted to highlight the anniversary, and the usual professional development seminars (PDSs) were replaced by an 'Emerging Topics in Nuclear Forensics' strand covering artificial intelligence (AI) and small modular reactors (SMRs). For ITWG-29 in Berlin we returned to the well-established agenda and have

scheduled two PDSs. The first focused on recognizing materials from various points in the nuclear fuel cycle and categorizing radioactive sources using hand-held or portable detectors; it was a hands-on session that taught participants how to acquire, process and interpret detector data in the field. The second addressed National Nuclear Forensics Libraries (NNFLs), concentrating on the organization and utilization of national nuclear forensics databases and subject-matter expertise in making assessments. Both PDSs are designed to strengthen practical skills—the first in source identification and the second in fostering a harmonized approach to national libraries of nuclear forensic signatures.

Continued page 2

Quick Summary of the 29th ITWG Annual Meeting... continued from page 1

The ITWG Nuclear Forensics Laboratories (INFL) again organized a series of technical presentations that showcased the latest scientific advances in the measurement and interpretation of nuclear forensic signatures. Many of them were directly linked to the outcomes of the most recent collaborative material exercise (CMX-8). These sessions provided participants with insight into cutting-edge analytical techniques, creative methodologies and multi-isotopic and elemental data streams.

International partners also contributed updates. Representatives from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Global Forum to Prevent Radiological and Nuclear Terrorism (Global FTPRNT) briefed participants on their current nuclear forensics activities, strategic priorities and forthcoming events.

The task groups (TGs) presented their latest work in the customary format. The Exercise TG (ETG) reviewed the outcomes of the recently concluded CMX-8, which incorporated a crime scene in a box (CSIAB) component and an NNFL element, making it the most complex exercise to date. The ETG also reflected on the findings of the Exercise Review Meeting (ERM) held on 11–15 May in Bucharest, Romania.

The Libraries and Assessments TG (LATG) discussed specific outcomes related to the CMX-8 NNFL component and introduced the next Galaxy Serpent exercise (GSv6), slated to commence later in

2026. The Evidence and Testimony TG (ETTG) continued its review of chain-of-custody and evidence-collection guidelines and reflected on the outcomes of the CSIAB component of CMX-8.

The Guidelines TG (GTG) provided a status report on the current draft consensus guidelines, notably the advanced draft of the NNFL guideline, and solicited input for future guideline topics. The Outreach and Training TG (OTTG) presented strategies for strengthening digital outreach via the two ITWG websites and previewed forthcoming ITWG publications such as the newsletter and the case studies series. The OTTG also continued its survey of existing training programmes, aimed at identifying gaps and discussed new modules to broaden the skill base of the community.

ITWG-29 delivered a balanced programme combining an investigative component through ITWG exercises, forward-looking science in the INFL sessions and practical guidance via the TGs. Although participation in the annual meetings continues to increase year after year, the ITWG's core purpose remains that of a working group, not a conference. Accordingly, we are pleased that participants engaged actively in the various sessions, contributing to the evolving guidelines and helping shape the future of nuclear forensics worldwide. The September 2026 issue of the ITWG Newsletter will be dedicated to a detailed recap of the successful Berlin meeting. •



Figure 1. Attendees of the February 2026 Global FTPRNT Plenary Meeting in Rabat, Morocco

THE GLOBAL FORUM TO PREVENT RADIOLOGICAL AND NUCLEAR TERRORISM: NUCLEAR FORENSICS FOR THE GLOBAL COMMUNITY

US DEPARTMENT OF STATE OFFICE OF WMD RESPONSE AND PLANNING

Strengthening nuclear security today depends not only on how well countries secure and protect radiological and nuclear (R/N) materials, but also on how effectively they can investigate, attribute and respond when those protections fail. The Global Forum to Prevent Radiological and Nuclear Terrorism (Global FTPRNT) is a multilateral security effort designed with that reality in mind. Through annual plenary meetings and regular tabletop exercises (TTXs), Global FTPRNT brings together willing and capable partners to build a shared understanding of global R/N threats, promote adherence to relevant legal frameworks and encourage countries to adopt best practices for prevention and preparedness, detection, nuclear forensics, response and mitigation, and countering emerging threats.

For nearly two decades, the United States and the Russian Federation co-chaired the 89-member Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT). Following the mutually agreed upon suspension of the GICNT in 2022 in response to Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Global FTPRNT was established to fill this critical gap in international nuclear security cooperation. In November 2024 Global FTPRNT held its inaugural meeting in Bucharest, Romania, and has since launched a series of TTXs aligned with the goals of the forum. Global FTPRNT serves as a critical platform to drive coordination and investment aimed at strengthening global capability to deter, prevent and counter R/N terrorism.

In February of this year, Global FTPRNT hosted its second plenary meeting in Rabat, Morocco (see figure 1). Over the course of three days, participants from across the globe engaged in substantive discussions, a scenario-based exercise and expert-level sessions focused on strengthening international cooperation to detect and respond to R/N terrorism threats.

Nuclear forensics featured heavily throughout the plenary meeting with multiple sessions demonstrating its critical role in countering illicit trafficking, deterring nuclear terrorism and strengthening global nuclear security. The Office of Nuclear Forensics at the US Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration framed the discussions with a plenary presentation showcasing how robust nuclear forensics capabilities enable governments to investigate and prosecute the illicit possession or use of R/N materials

while identifying the origin of materials out of regulatory control (see figure 2 on page 4). Building on these discussions, breakout sessions explored nuclear forensics from multiple angles.

The first panel session focused on the experiences of Italy, Morocco and Tajikistan in putting nuclear forensics into practice, which highlighted real-world applications of this critical capability. Participants from Tajikistan, for example, shared information about a recent interdiction of uranium pellets and demonstrated how they leveraged nuclear forensics to identify the material in support of the investigation. Practical case studies in this session equipped participants to apply nuclear forensics capabilities to real-world investigations—particularly for identifying nuclear materials outside of regulatory control and supporting the prosecution of those responsible for their misuse.

A subsequent panel brought together experts from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Nigerian Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA) and the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) to discuss building and applying nuclear forensics expertise across diverse national contexts. The insights shared will strengthen pathways for international coordination and information exchange, and serve as a foundation for future Global FTPRNT plenary meetings and engagements.

The final panel spotlighted National Nuclear Forensics Libraries, with Italy, Mauritania and Morocco showcasing their efforts to develop and maintain these critical databases that underpin effective investigations. Collectively, these sessions underscored the critical role played by nuclear forensics in investigating and prosecuting the illicit possession or use of R/N materials and in identifying the origin of materials out of regulatory control.

Nuclear forensics was also highlighted during Morocco's comprehensive counter-R/N terrorism demonstration, which simulated a multi-agency response to a radiological incident and showcased crisis decision making, interagency coordination, and applied nuclear forensics, detection and mitigation strategies in a realistic setting. Following the demonstration, attendees at the plenary put these concepts into practice during a TTX covering the

The Global Forum... *continued from page 3*

Figure 2. Alison Goodsell, Director of the Office of Nuclear Forensics at the US Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration, presents on nuclear forensics

challenges associated with investigating terrorist smuggling of nuclear material. Participants from a wide range of countries and fields shared their varied expertise and perspectives gained from working through such incidents in their own countries. Participants expressed appreciation for the discussions, as they helped deepen understanding of the complexity of R/N-related investigations and the need for interagency and international collaboration to address these important issues.

Looking ahead, the Republic of Korea announced it would host the third plenary meeting of the Global FTPRNT. This commitment reflects the growing international momentum to address the potential threat posed by R/N terrorism while demonstrating the Global FTPRNT's success in fostering shared responsibility and burden-sharing among its members. The next plenary will continue to advance critical forensics discussions and looks forward to the contributions and active participation of ITWG members. For more information about Global FTPRNT or to inquire about hosting a TTX, please contact GlobalFTPRNT@state.gov. •

'IT IS IMPORTANT TO FULLY INVESTIGATE EVERY CASE UNTIL YOU'RE SURE IT'S NOT A CLUE TO SOMETHING SERIOUS HAPPENING': INTERVIEW WITH SIDNEY NIEMEYER

VITALY FEDCHENKO AND LIZ DALLAS

Sidney Niemeyer has been called a 'founding father' of the new field of nuclear forensics. During his career at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), he articulated the need for the United States to develop a nuclear forensics capability to address the new reality of a post-cold war world. Believing global cooperation was essential, he chaired an international conference in 1995 that led to the formation of the ITWG, which he co-chaired for 12 years.

In 2014 he—together with Lothar Koch—gave a talk at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on a paper titled 'The Historical Evolution of Nuclear Forensics: A Technical Viewpoint'.¹ That paper brought unusual clarity and breadth to

its examination of nuclear forensics as a maturing scientific discipline with policy consequences for the changing world. Twelve years later, with nuclear forensics and the world changing further, we revisit that paper's strategic insights in an interview with Sidney Niemeyer, discussing the long arc of the discipline's development.

1. At what point did the term 'nuclear forensics' become widely adopted? Were there competing names or framings at the time of the discipline's formation? Did the naming itself help or hinder acceptance within the technical and policy communities?

Sidney Niemeyer: The term 'nuclear forensics' emerged in the early 1990s, although it was not solidified as the standard terminology until the mid 2000s. Initially, at least in the USA, the field developed under the competing term 'nuclear attribution', which was

¹ Niemeyer, S. and Koch, L., 'The historical evolution of nuclear forensics: A technical viewpoint', IAEA-CN-218/117, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) International Conference on Advances in Nuclear Forensics: Countering the Evolving Threat of Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material out of Regulatory Control, Vienna, 7–10 July 2014.

stimulated by Hans Mark's 1991 talk at the LLNL on what he called the 'unattributed nuclear weapon' problem. Both terms coexisted throughout the 1990s and early 2000s.

The competing terminologies reflected different perspectives among professional communities regarding the central question being addressed. Law enforcement objected strongly to the term 'attribution'; for them, attribution was primarily associated with identifying perpetrators. In contrast, scientists and technical experts understood attribution to mean determining the origin of materials—where they came from and how they were made. Ultimately, 'nuclear forensics' replaced 'attribution' by the mid 2000s, with the accompanying understanding that the field was focused on providing scientific and technical evidence, rather than criminal attribution of responsibility.

2. In the 2014 paper you describe how, early on, scientists continually had to remind themselves they were answering a genuinely new question—the origin and history of a nuclear material. In hindsight, what was the single biggest conceptual shift required to frame nuclear forensics as its own discipline, distinct from other disciplines (e.g. safeguards) that laboratory scientists were focusing on before that?

Sidney Niemeyer: The framing of nuclear forensics as its own discipline involved at least two fundamental departures from established nuclear science practices. The first shift was working with unknown materials. This is a highly unusual starting point for the nuclear community as a whole. Starting with an unknown material creates not only analytical challenges but also practical ones, such as regulatory issues around admitting the unknown radioactive material to the lab or transporting it. This contrasted sharply with fields like safeguards, where the material's source is known, and the task is to characterize it.

The second shift involved the central question. Nuclear forensics focused on determining the origin and history of materials: where they came from, how they were made and how they arrived at the point of interdiction. This differed from the questions typically addressed in a nuclear laboratory, such as measuring nuclear reactions, tracking changes in materials or verifying that materials meet specific requirements. LLNL scientists initially fell into familiar working patterns rather than focusing on the forensic questions of material origin. They continually had to remind themselves that while they were using skills developed

in their regular work, they were now answering a fundamentally different question.

3. You identify in the 2014 paper that serendipity played an important role in the development of nuclear forensics. What were the two or three most consequential accidents of timing, personality or circumstance? What were the moments where things could easily have gone differently?

Sidney Niemeyer: I can think of three consequential instances of serendipity that shaped the development of nuclear forensics in the USA, each involving new organizational structures and fortuitous timing.

The first instance was the emergence of a catalytic conference. A US Department of Energy (DOE) official who served on the G8 (Group of Eight) non-proliferation experts group suggested at a meeting in Ottawa, Canada, in May 1995 that an international conference should address the role of nuclear forensics in combating illicit trafficking. The official requested that the DOE sponsor the conference and that I should chair it. I had no advance knowledge of this proposal, though I had briefed this official multiple times. This conference became known as the 'International Conference on Nuclear Smuggling Forensic Analysis' and was held at the LLNL on 7–9 November 1995. Critical to its success was the participation of key individuals involved in analysing interdicted nuclear materials in Europe, particularly Lothar Koch from the Institute for Transuranium Elements (ITU) in Karlsruhe, Germany, who had led most analyses of seized materials. The US Department of State facilitated significant international participation and the conference ultimately led to the formation of the ITWG. While my briefing efforts might have paved the way, the actual proposal emerged unexpectedly.

The second instance involved the establishment of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) as a new US Department of Defense entity. A senior colleague of mine from the LLNL became the first director of the DTRA in 1998 and served until 2001. He had also attended Hans Mark's 1991 talk on the 'unattributed nuclear weapon' and was instrumental in sponsoring initial internal research at the LLNL. When he led the DTRA, he had the latitude to define its focus areas and made nuclear forensics a programme element. This resulted in the first substantial US funding for the development of nuclear forensics capabilities. The timing was consequential because a new organization provided opportunities to establish programmes that existing agencies had resisted.

Interview with Sidney Niemeyer... *continued from page 5*

The third instance of serendipity occurred with the establishment of the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2002. For approximately a decade before that, the LLNL, the Los Alamos National Laboratory and the Sandia National Laboratories had made unified proposals to the DOE for nuclear forensics funding, all without success. When the DHS came into being, some small existing nuclear forensics activities were transferred there. In around 2003–2004 I led a team of approximately 120 scientists at the LLNL to draft white papers for the DHS's nuclear counterterrorism programme. Out of the 12 white papers we developed, we received feedback that the DHS liked every one—except the one on nuclear forensics. The DHS did not see that as part of its programme. However, I secured a briefing with the key decision maker at the DHS, during which I presented the ITWG's work and the analysis of a sample of highly enriched uranium (HEU) that had been intercepted in Bulgaria in 1999.² I then made my

'elevator pitch'. I said, I know you're going to invest significant funding into developing detector systems so you can detect nuclear materials coming into the USA, but what are you going to do when you're successful in detecting such material? Shouldn't you invest in nuclear forensics to fully exploit the evidence and determine material origins? This convinced this decision maker, who later arranged for me to make a similar briefing at the White House. This led to the creation of pre-detonation nuclear forensics as a component of the USA's national counterterrorism work, beginning in 2004.

The point that I managed to get across in that briefing remains very important to this day: you must 'close the loop' on the interdicted material by investigating its origins and history. The only clue we might have before a nuclear terrorist act might be a seemingly unconnected case somewhere relating to interdicted material. If you simply remove the material to safe storage and leave it there, you may remain unaware of any potentially malicious intent associated with it. For instance, what if there is another shipment of the same material elsewhere? This is also the principal point I tried to make in my first novel, *Atomic Peril*: it is important to fully investigate every case until you're sure it's not a clue to something serious

² Niemeyer, S. and Hutcheon, I., 'Forensic analysis of a smuggled HEU sample interdicted in Bulgaria', IAEA-CN-98/2/09, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) International Conference on Advances in Destructive and Non-destructive Analysis for Environmental Monitoring and Nuclear Forensics, Karlsruhe, 21–23 Oct. 2002.

NOTABLE PUBLICATIONS ON THE WORK OF THE ITWG, NUCLEAR FORENSICS AND RELATED DISCIPLINES

- Mathew, K. J., Hixon, A. E. and Higginson, M., 'Editorial: Analytical methods in nuclear forensics', *Frontiers in Nuclear Engineering*, vol. 5 (2026).
- Patz, H. K. et al., 'Advances in autoradiography systems for nuclear forensic analysis', *Nuclear Science and Engineering* (17 Mar. 2026), pp. 1–17.
- Lambert, L. C., Borghetti, B. J. and Bickley, A. A., 'Uranium chemical compound classification using sub-images and statistical machine learning for nuclear forensics', *Journal of Radioanalytical and Nuclear Chemistry*, vol. 335 (2026), pp. 2123–2154.
- Lorincik, J. et al., 'Interlaboratory comparison of secondary ion mass spectrometry analysis results from the 7th international technical nuclear forensics working group collaborative material exercise', *Journal of Radioanalytical and Nuclear Chemistry*, vol. 335 (2026), pp. 2191–2204.
- Macsik, Z. and Pommé, S., 'Comparison of three uncertainty propagation methods for ²³⁴U–²³⁰Th radiochronometry in nuclear forensics', *Journal of Radioanalytical and Nuclear Chemistry*, vol. 335 (2026), pp. 3999–4002.
- Hrabar, Y. et al., 'Multi-coincidence set-up for nuclear forensics with Si-strip and Compton-suppressed HPGe detectors', *Journal of Environmental Radioactivity*, vol. 291 (Jan. 2026), art. 107837.

happening.³ David Smith and I made the same point in 2007 in our article in *Arms Control Today*.⁴

4. If a junior scientist today were trying to build another new interdisciplinary field at the intersection of science and international security policy (or even trying to build a new nuclear forensics programme in their country), what is the single most important lesson from the development of nuclear forensics that they should take with them?

Sidney Niemeyer: Establishing a new interdisciplinary field at the intersection of science and international security policy (like nuclear forensics) requires three essential elements. First, you need a clear articulation of the need and a firm idea of how to proceed technically in developing the capability. Both components are necessary: understanding what is needed and having a concrete plan for technical development.

³ Niemeyer, S., *Atomic Peril: A Nuclear Forensics Thriller* (Quantum Publishing: Carnforth, Oct. 2023).

⁴ Niemeyer, S. and Smith, D. K., 'Following the clues: The role of forensics in preventing nuclear terrorism', *Arms Control Today*, vol. 37, no. 6 (July 2007).

Second, you must gain support from the policy community, either directly or indirectly. You cannot simply push the initiative up from the bottom through technical work alone; engagement from the policy side is essential. This requires understanding the language and concerns of policymakers, which differ significantly from scientific proposal writing. You have to become familiar with policymakers and their priorities and adapt messages to resonate with their existing concerns. The example I gave earlier, about briefing a decision maker at the DHS, is relevant here as well. I knew that that person was focused on establishing the detector systems, so I framed my nuclear forensics pitch around that driver.

Third, and perhaps most important, you should expect the process to be extremely difficult and prepare for long-term perseverance. I worked on nuclear forensics for 10 years before receiving any real funding. The landscape of policy concerns shifts constantly, requiring repeated adjustment of messaging and approach. When the landscape changes, the message must change, necessitating continuous re-examination and adaptation. •

UPCOMING TRAINING COURSES AND MEETINGS*

- IAEA Regional Workshop on Radiological Crime Scene Management, Mexico, 24–28 August 2026
- IAEA Regional Training Course on Basic Introduction to Nuclear Forensics, Paraguay, 14–18 September 2026
- IAEA Regional Training Course on Practical Introduction to Nuclear Forensics, Hungary, 28 September–2 October 2026
- IAEA Regional Training Course on Practical Introduction to Nuclear Forensics, France, 28 September–2 October 2026

*Please check directly with the event organizer on the status and dates for implementation of the individual events listed above.

Dates and locations of IAEA training courses and meetings will be officially confirmed with host member states; participation in IAEA training courses and meetings is by nomination and in accordance with established IAEA procedures.

CONTENTS

Chairpersons' Address	1
Quick Summary of the 29th ITWG Annual Meeting	1
The Global Forum to Prevent Radiological and Nuclear Terrorism: Nuclear Forensics for the Global Community	3
'It is important to fully investigate every case until you're sure it's not a clue to something serious happening': Interview with Sidney Niemeyer	4
Notable Publications on the Work of the ITWG, Nuclear Forensics and Related Disciplines	6
Upcoming Training Courses and Meetings	7

NUCLEAR FORENSICS

Nuclear forensics is an essential component of national and international nuclear security response plans to events involving radioactive materials diverted outside of regulatory control. The ability to collect and preserve radiological and associated evidence as material is interdicted and to conduct nuclear forensics analysis provides insights to the history and origin of nuclear material, the point of diversion, and the identity of the perpetrators.

THE NUCLEAR FORENSICS INTERNATIONAL TECHNICAL WORKING GROUP

Since its inception in 1995, the Nuclear Forensics International Technical Working Group (ITWG) has been focused on nuclear forensic best practice through the development of techniques and methods for forensic analysis of nuclear, other radioactive, and radiologically contaminated materials. The objective of the ITWG is to advance the scientific discipline of nuclear forensics and to provide a common approach and effective technical solutions to competent national or international authorities that request assistance.

ITWG PRIORITIES AND ACTIVITIES

As a technical working group, the priorities for the ITWG include identifying requirements for nuclear forensic applications, evaluating present nuclear forensic capabilities, and recommending cooperative measures that ensure all states can respond to acts involving illicit trafficking and unauthorized possession of nuclear or other radioactive materials. An objective of the working group is to encourage technical peer-review of the nuclear forensic discipline. These goals are met through annual meetings, exercises, and informal and formal publications.

Outreach is a primary goal of the ITWG. The working group disseminates recent progress in nuclear forensic analysis and interpretation with the broader community of technical and security professionals who can benefit from these advancements. Affiliated international partner organizations include the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the European Commission, the European Police Office (EUROPOL), the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) and the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI).

ITWG MEMBERSHIP

Nuclear forensics is both a technical capability as well as an investigatory process. For this reason the ITWG is a working group of experts including scientists, law enforcement officers, first responders, and nuclear regulators assigned by competent national authorities, affiliated contractors, and international organizations. The ITWG is open to all states interested in nuclear forensics.

ITWG participating states and organizations recognize that radiological crimes deserve thorough investigation and, when warranted, criminal prosecution. The ITWG encourages all states to possess the basic capability to categorize nuclear or other radioactive materials to assess their threat. As an international group, the ITWG shares its expertise through its membership to advance the science of nuclear forensics as well as its application to nuclear security objectives.

<http://www.nf-itwg.org/>

The 'ITWG Nuclear Forensics Update' is produced by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) on behalf of the Nuclear Forensics International Technical Working Group and with the financial support provided by the United States Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration. The content and the views expressed here belong to the authors.



© The Nuclear Forensics International Technical Working Group 2026